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We use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the English auction (EA) and thefirst-price sealed-bid auction (FPA) when procuring a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are
lower in the FPA than in the EA. Bids and prices in the EA agree with game-theoretic predictions, but they do
not agree in the FPA. To resolve these deviations found in the FPA, we introduce a mixture model with three
bidding rules: constant absolute markup, constant percentage markup, and strategic best response. A dynamic
specification in which bidders can switch strategies as they gain experience is estimated as a hidden Markov
model. Initially, about three quarters of the subjects are strategic bidders, but over time, the number of strategic
bidders falls to below 65%. There is a corresponding growth in those who use the constant absolute markup rule.
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1. Introduction
Large organizations, which procure a wide range of
goods and services, are increasingly finding them-
selves contemplating changes from traditional request
for quote mechanisms to dynamic reverse auctions.
Practitioners (Purchasing 2001, Chafkin 2007) and aca-
demics (Jap 2002, Elmaghraby 2007) commonly sug-
gest that when organizations consider this change
they should start with their commodity purchases.
For current purposes, commodities are goods for
which the organization considers price the sole dif-
ferentiating attribute among suppliers. When price is
the sole determinant of supplier choice, a request for
quote mechanism reduces to a first-price sealed-bid
auction (FPA), and a dynamic reverse auction reduces
to an English auction (EA). This raises the need for
some basic comparative empirical knowledge of the
two auction formats for procurement officials in such
organizations. Toward filling this need, this study
provides insights into the relative empirical price per-
formance between the FPA and the EA in the context
of procuring commodities, the nature of how suppli-
ers bid when having little to no experience in such
auctions, and how their bidding behaviors adjust as
they gain experience.
We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment
designed so that inferences on performance, behavior,
and dynamics are made without concern for estimat-
ing suppliers’ costs or the procuring organization’s
willingness to pay. We report statistical tests com-
paring properties of the empirical price distributions
generated within the FPA and EA versus each other
and against theoretical benchmarks. The results of
these tests show that the mean and variance of prices
are lower in the FPA, prices in the EA first-order
stochastically dominate those in the FPA, and the Nash
equilibrium predictions regarding prices and individ-
ual bids are accurate in the EA but not in the FPA.
Our investigation of the procurement context is
an important extension in the broader experimen-
tal study of FPA and EA auctions with independent
and private information.1 Previous experimental and
behavioral studies have almost exclusively consid-
ered the forward context; i.e., the auctioneer is sell-
ing an object, and a bidder’s private information is
his valuation of that object. Our results demonstrate
that the previously observed robustness of game-
theoretic predicted performance in the EA extends to
the procurement context. Likewise, we replicate pre-
vious deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions
in the FPA; however, the procurement setting permits
us to identify a new explanation for these deviations.
Namely, there is a discrete heterogeneity in the bid-
ding rules subjects follow. Two of these rules are non-
strategic and have more sensible interpretations in the
1 “Independent and private” here refers to the fact suppliers’ costs
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procurement setting than in the forward one. One rule
is to use an absolute markup in which a constant
amount is added to a bidder’s realized cost. We believe
that demanding a constant profit margin is a more
natural decision heuristic in a selling context relative
to its forward auction counterpart, in which a bid-
der demands a constant amount of consumer surplus
independent of the valuation. The other nonstrategic
rule is to use a fixed proportional markup of realized
cost. Requiring a certain rate of return is a common
rule of thumb used by businesses when setting prices,
and it generates a positive relationship between costs
and the absolute amount of profit demanded. In a
procurement FPA, this rule is distinct from Nash equi-
librium bidding, which generates a negative relation-
ship between cost and profit demanded. In contrast,
both these rules generate an increasing relationship
between valuation and demanded consumer surplus
in the forward FPA. This makes econometric iden-
tification of the Nash equilibrium and percentage
markup rules difficult, if not impossible, in the for-
ward FPA.
To explain and estimate this discrete bidding het-
erogeneity, we present a quasi-equilibrium model of
bidding in the FPA based on a mixture of strategic
and rule-of-thumb bidders. Then a dynamic version
of this model is estimated as a hidden Markov model;
the latent variable is the rule a subject follows in each
auction period. In the initial stage of the experiment,
we estimate about three-quarters of the subjects fol-
low a strategic bidding rule, and the remaining sub-
jects follow either an absolute or a percentage markup
rule. The estimated dynamics are surprising because
bidders become less strategic as they gain experience.
During the sequence of 30 auctions, the proportion
of strategic bidders falls below two-thirds, and there
is a corresponding rise in the proportion of bidders
who simply bid a small constant absolute amount
above cost.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In §2,
we review the relevant literatures. This is fol-
lowed by the development of hypotheses regard-
ing the performance of the two auction types in
§3. Next, we present the details of the experi-
mental design and procedures in §4. Then, in §5,
there is an empirical analysis of the price per-
formance and bidder behavior in the experiment.
In §6, we discuss the theoretical mixture bidding
model for the FPA, and the estimation results of
a hidden Markov dynamic version of the model
are presented in §7. In §8, we demonstrate the
robustness of this model through specification tests
against multiple alternative models found in the
literature. We conclude the paper in §9 by com-
menting on implications of the results and possible
extensions.
2. Related Auction Literature
Our evaluation of the relative price performances
of the procurement FPA and EA contributes to the
extensive experimental literature testing the revenue
equivalence theorem in basic auction formats. The
original version of the theorem (Vickrey 1961) states
that expected prices are the same for the FPA, the
Dutch auction (a dynamic auction with the same
normal game form as the FPA), the second-price
sealed-bid auction (which has the same normal game
form as the EA), and the EA when bidder types
are independent and identically distributed private
information. As far as we know, all other experimen-
tal tests of the revenue equivalence theorem use for-
ward auctions. Most of these early studies focus on
making comparisons within pairs of normal game
form-equivalent auctions. For example, Coppinger
et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982) find that the EA
and the second-price sealed-bid auction generate the
same expected prices, whereas the FPA generates
higher prices than the Dutch auction. In a well-known
field experimental study, Lucking-Reiley (1999) finds
the same revenue equivalence between the EA and the
second-price sealed-bid auction but observes that the
average Dutch auction price exceeds that of the FPA—
contradicting the results of earlier laboratory studies.
These and other studies speak little to the comparison
of the EA and the FPA, which vary both in the normal
game form and Nash equilibrium solution. However,
the nature of our applied procurement problem begs
this comparison.
Considering the procurement rather than the for-
ward context is a key aspect of our study, despite this
difference in context having no effect on Nash equi-
librium and the prediction of revenue equivalence.
The impact in auctions of nonstrategic factors, such
as context and framing, has many precedents. Many
auction formats have the same normal game form
representations as the second-price auction, and
researchers often exploit this relationship by analyz-
ing such auctions as second-price ones. However,
Zeithammer and Adams (2010) demonstrate that in
EAs with bidder proxies on eBay, this second-price
auction abstraction fails. Hossain and Morgan (2006)
and Brown et al. (2010) find a failure of revenue
equivalence in a series of eBay auctions that are iden-
tical except for the framing of fixed shipping and
handling fees. An additional example, Dholakia and
Simonson (2005) demonstrate in a field experiment
that including explicit reference points to compet-
ing prices—which does not impact the equilibrium
predictions—raises auction prices. In a related work,
Fay (2004) shows that multiple-bid versus single-
bid formats of name-your-own-price auctions are
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profit increases in the multiple-bid format as the num-
ber of sophisticated bidders grows. In response to the
revenue equivalence failure, each of these studies for-
mulates an appropriate behavioral model to capture
the effect of the framing variation. We also argue from
a behavioral perspective that the procurement context
facilitates the adoption of simple pricing heuristics,
which have less intuitive counterparts in the forward
context.
The performance of an auction is a product of
the individual bidding behavior, as these previous
studies found that identifying better models of indi-
vidual behavior leads to better explanations of auc-
tion performance. Thus identification of the bidding
behavior is crucial to understanding why auction
formats perform differently. A large segment of the
structural econometric modeling of auctions litera-
ture proceeds by assuming that bidders follow Nash
equilibrium strategies and then use properties of the
Nash equilibrium to establish identification and con-
sistent estimation of parameters such as the bid-
der’s underlying values and beliefs. Hendricks and
Porter (1988), Laffont et al. (1995), Guerre et al. (2009),
and Krasnokutskaya (2011) represent a very incom-
plete list of examples from this literature that analyze
the private value, single object case. Reliance on the
strong rationality assumptions of Nash equilibrium
is a natural criticism of this approach. In response,
recent alternatives have built structural empirical bid-
ding models without relying on the Nash equilibrium
assumption for identification (Goeree et al. 2002, Park
and Bradlow 2005, Chan et al. 2007, Yao and Mela
2008, Abbas and Hann 2010) or have taken a reduced-
form approach (Jap and Naik 2008, Bradlow and Park
2007) to build forecasting models. In many ways, our
work is in the spirit of structural models that relax
the assumption of Nash equilibrium, although, given
the nature of our experimental data, we mostly focus
on the estimation of bidding rule parameters and the
distribution of rules in the population.
The performance differences we observe between
the EA and the FPA are driven by individual devia-
tions from Nash equilibrium bidding in the FPA. Thus
our modeling approach to individual bidding brings
new insights into the extensive literature examining
non-Nash bidding in FPA forward auctions. In one
of the earliest experimental studies of a forward FPA
with independent private values, Cox et al. (1982)
find that the vast majority of bids exceed the Nash
equilibrium-predicted ones, thus leading to higher-
than-predicted prices. They further propose a new
Nash equilibrium model in which the bidders are
characterized by heterogeneous risk attitudes. Their
simple elegant solution is highly scrutinized by Kagel
and Levin (1993) and others (see Kagel 1995; Kagel
and Levin 2008, 2012 for thorough reviews), who gen-
erate data that cannot be explained by models of
risk aversion. Proposed alternatives to explain the
data from these subsequent experiments use princi-
ples from behavioral economics such as anticipated
regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007, 2008;
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007) and nonlinear proba-
bility weighting (Armantier and Treich 2009a, b), or
they adopt alternative game-theoretic solutions to the
Nash equilibrium (Goeree et al. 2002, Morgan et al.
2003, Ockenfels and Selten 2005).
Our alternative behavioral model for bidding in the
FPA, in its static form, follows a recent approach of
allowing discrete strategic heterogeneity. In an influ-
ential study, Crawford and Iriberri (2007) replace the
stringent belief assumptions of Nash equilibrium with
a level-k strategic model to analyze FPAs. In the
level-k model, each bidder is characterized by a non-
negative integer k, indicating the number of steps of
iterated best response he performs when selecting a
strategy. The iterated best-response process starts with
some boundedly rational rule for step k = 0. For the
forward FPA, Crawford and Iriberri consider two pos-
sible k = 0 strategies: bid the true value or bid ran-
domly according to a uniform distribution over the
interval from the minimum allowable bid to value.
A k = 1 type believes all other bidders follow a par-
ticular k = 0 strategy and best responds; correspond-
ingly, a k = 2 type believes all other bidders are k = 1
and best responds, and so on. Crawford and Iriberri
apply this model to an FPA experiment with a dis-
crete valuation space reported in Goeree et al. (2002)
and find that it performs quite favorably to other
models. Moreover, they estimate a full mixture model
and find that approximately 4%, 76%, and 20% of
the subjects follow the level k = 0, 1, and 2 rules,
respectively.
In a second paper using mixtures of bidding rules,
Kirchkamp and Reiss (2008) consider a model of two
bidders in which there is some probability a bidder
bids a fixed markdown of his valuation; otherwise,
the bidder is rational and best responds while tak-
ing full account of the mixture distribution of rational
and fixed markdown bidders. This model differs from
Crawford and Iriberri (2007) because it specifies a dif-
ferent k = 0, and the k = 1 type best responds accord-
ing to the true distribution of the level types rather
than the belief that all bidders are k = 0. Kirchkamp
and Reiss (2008) test their model in a series of for-
ward FPAs that allow bids less than the lowest possi-
ble valuation. By estimating individual bid functions,
they find that roughly 30% of the subjects follow the
markdown, whereas the remaining subjects follow the
more rational rule. It should be noted that these mod-
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their level-k formulation is a model of how inexperi-
enced individuals bid (accordingly, they only consider
the first five rounds of each experimental session in
their analysis), and the Kirchkamp and Reiss (2008)
model is quasi-equilibrium. Our model first extends
the Kirchkamp and Reiss model by allowing multiple
participants and additional bidding heuristic rules.
Moreover, we take a step forward in this modeling
approach by allowing bidders to switch rules over
time and model this dynamic to examine how indi-
viduals adapt with experience.
Our dynamic extension is a significant advance in
identifying how bidders in the FPA adapt with expe-
rience. Despite the large number of FPA studies, sur-
prisingly few of them address how individuals learn
to bid over time. The most developed empirical lit-
erature on learning in FPAs focuses on the impact
of the informational feedback provided to bidders.
If a forward FPA provides the winning bid, or the
whole vector of bids, then bid functions are estimated
to increase to levels above the Nash equilibrium
(Selten and Buchta 1998, Guth et al. 2003, Neugebauer
and Selten 2006). However, in the absence of this
feedback, behavior converges toward the risk-neutral
Nash equilibrium (Neugebauer and Perote 2008). The
workhouse dynamic principle of this literature is the
directional learning model introduced by Selten and
Buchta (1998). Directional learning is more of a behav-
ioral principle than a complete model, as it only speci-
fies that individuals adjust their strategy toward those
who offer ex post higher payoffs conditional on avail-
able information.
The set of investigations regarding structural learn-
ing models is less developed. Bajari and Hortacsu
(2005) find that econometric models that assume sub-
jects follow an adaptive learning process do not out-
perform equilibrium models with risk aversion in
recovering structural parameters. Recent efforts to
study learning in FPA auctions using Camerer and
Ho’s (1999) experienced weighted attraction (EWA)
model also have had limited success. James and
Reagle (2009) find that EWA models can generate
aggregate data similar to aggregate human subject
data, but the EWA parameters are extremely diffi-
cult to recover econometrically. Furthermore, Dittrich
et al. (2011) find great between-subject heterogeneity
in their EWA model estimates as well as significant
estimated loss aversion. The dynamic rule-switching
model we study advances these efforts by demonstrat-
ing that individual heterogeneity is well explained
by a small set of discrete rules and that observed
increasing (or decreasing, in our procurement setting)
deviations from Nash equilibrium in FPA arises from
individuals increasingly adopting absolute markup
strategies that demand small profit margins.
3. Environment Formulation and
the Development of Auction
Performance Hypotheses
Let us begin by considering the simple situation with
a procurement official whose task is to purchase an
indivisible unit of a commodity as cheaply as possi-
ble. There are n potential suppliers indexed by i. Each
supplier can provide a unit of the commodity for the
cost of ci, which is incurred only if they supply the
unit. The cost ci is only known by supplier i—i.e., it is
private information—and will typically vary across
suppliers. Suppliers are symmetric in that none has
an ex ante cost advantage. Specifically, each supplier’s
costs is an independent realization from a random
variable whose distribution is uniform on the interval
6cL1 cH 7. Whereas each supplier knows his own real-
ized costs, the other suppliers and the procurement
official only know its distribution.
We consider two sourcing methods for this sce-
nario. First is the EA, which starts at an initial high
price, and all n suppliers are still participants. Then
the price sequentially decrements. At each decrement,
a participant can take the action to irreversibly exit the
auction, after which he is no longer considered a par-
ticipant. At each decrement, the number of remain-
ing participants and current price are publicly posted.
The auction closes when the second-to-last participant
exits. The last remaining participant wins the auction
and receives the closing auction price, p. This winning
supplier i receives a profit of p− ci, and all other sup-
pliers receive zero profit.2 The EA has a weakly dom-
inant strategy: a supplier chooses to exit the auction
when the price equals his unit cost.3 When everyone
follows the weakly dominant strategy, the losing sup-
pliers reveal their true costs, and the supplier with
the lowest realized cost wins the auction and subse-
quently receives a price equal to the second-lowest
realized cost. Consequently, the price paid by the pro-
curement official is a random variable whose distri-
bution is the second-order statistic of the n suppliers’
cost realizations.
In an FPA, each supplier privately submits a price.
Then the procurement official purchases from the
lowest-priced supplier, and that supplier receives a
price equal to his bid. Under the crucial assumption
2 There are other formats of the EA. For example, in an open outcry
format, individual suppliers can announce successively lower bids
until there is no supplier willing to improve on the current exist-
ing price. The supplier submitting the last price wins the auction
at that price. In the strategic analysis, optimal bidder behavior is
equivalent in the open outcry format and the version we describe.
3 One can find standard arguments for this weakly dominant strat-
egy in texts such as Krishna (2002). A weakly dominant strategy in
this context means that regardless of the other suppliers’ strategies,
there is never an instance in which the supplier can strictly increase
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bids depend on the associated costs that the sup-
pliers are all risk neutral, the pure-strategy symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium calls for a supplier to submit a
price according to the following function of his real-
ized cost and the number of potential suppliers (see
Vickrey 1961):
bi4ci5=
cH + 4n− 15ci
n
0
This bidding strategy has an interesting behav-
ioral interpretation; a supplier’s bid is equal to the
expected second-lowest realized cost conditional on
his cost being the lowest. Thus, the unconditional
expected winning price is the amount that the uncon-
ditional lowest expected cost type bids. One can show
that this is just the unconditional expected value of
the second-lowest realized cost, same as the expected
auction price in the EA. This is an example of the
revenue equivalence theorem4 and forms our first
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The expected prices in the FPA and the
EA are the same.
Let us consider an example with three suppli-
ers whose costs are independent and uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval 601207. In this case the
expected value of the lowest, second-lowest, and
highest costs are 5, 10, and 15, respectively. Figure 1
depicts the expected outcomes in both auction for-
mats. In the EA, the winner’s expected cost is five.
Furthermore, the expected second-lowest cost, and
the corresponding auction price, is 10. In the FPA, we
expect the winning supplier’s cost is also 5 and for
him to bid 10, the expected second-lowest cost condi-
tional upon 5 being the lowest.
Of course, although the expected—or average—
prices are the same, the distributions of prices are not.
In the EA it is easy to see that the actual winning
price can occur anywhere on the interval 601207. At
the same time, Figure 1 shows that the support of pos-
sible prices in the FPA is smaller. The lower end of
this support occurs when a supplier’s cost is 0 and he
bids 6 23 . The upper end of this support occurs when
the lowest supplier’s cost is 20 and he bids 20. Thus
the distribution of prices in the EA is a mean preserv-
ing spread of the prices in the FPA. In fact, Vickrey
(1961) shows that with independent and uniformly
distributed costs and n bidders, the variance of the
price in the EA is 424n− 154cH − cL525/44n+ 254n+ 1525
4 The revenue equivalence theorem was first proven by Vickrey
(1961) and is applicable to our scenario. It was proven for a wider
class of scenarios by Myerson (1981). The version used here states
that if sellers are risk neutral, if they have independent and sym-
metric costs, and if payment is a function of the bid only, then the
FPA and the EA will have the same expected price.
and in the FPA is 44n− 154cH − cL525/4n4n+ 254n+ 1525.
So the variance in the EA price is greater than that of
the FPA by a factor of 42n5/4n− 15; this is our second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The variance of price in the EA is
greater than in the FPA.
Next we formulate an alternative hypothesis by set-
ting aside the assumption that suppliers are risk neu-
tral, and instead, we assume that they are risk averse.
Because risk neutrality is a necessary condition for
revenue equivalence, we should now be able to order
the expected price in the two auctions. First, in the
EA, because it has a weakly dominant strategy, risk
aversion does not affect suppliers’ predicted behav-
ior or the expected price. This is not true for the
FPA. Holt (1980) shows that if all suppliers have
the same risk-averse, von Neumann–Morgenstern
expected utility function, then there exists a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium in which the expected price is
lower than that of the EA. Consequently, we have the
following alternative to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 3. The expected or average price in the
FPA will be lower than in the EA.
Note that replacing the assumption of risk neutral-
ity does not change the hypothesis regarding ranking
of price variances.
So far, we have only considered the procuring orga-
nization’s welfare—price in this case—but what about
the suppliers? First, under the assumption of risk neu-
trality, the expected profit is the same in both the
EA and the FPA. This is the expected lowest cost
less the expected second-lowest cost multiplied by the
probability of being the lowest-cost supplier. In our
example, this is $1.67. However, the difference is the
variance of a supplier’s payoff (profit) is much higher
than for the price. The variances for a supplier’s profit
in the EA is 4n4cH − cL525/44n− 254n+ 1525 and in the
FPA is 4cH − cL52/4n4n+ 254n+ 1525; the difference is a
factor of n2. We summarize these observations with
the following pair of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4. The expected profit of a supplier in the
FPA and the EA is the same.
Hypothesis 5. The variance of a supplier’s profit in the
EA is greater than in the FPA.
Once again, replacing the assumption of supplier
risk neutrality with risk aversion gives us an alterna-
tive hypothesis to equal expected supplier profit.
Hypothesis 6. The expected profit of a supplier is
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Note. This figure illustrates that although the expected prices are the same, the distribution of prices differs for the EA and FPA.
4. Experimental Design and
Procedures
All experimental sessions were conducted at the Eco-
nomics Laboratory at the University of California,
San Diego (UCSD) and at the National University of
Singapore (NUS) School of Business. All participants
were either undergraduates or master’s students at
one of the two universities. FPA and EA sessions were
conducted at both facilities. The number of partici-
pants in an experimental session consisted of some
multiple of 3 between 9 and 18. Experimental ses-
sions lasted no more than one hour, and subjects
earned between $8 (S$12) and $60 (S$89) inclusive of
a show-up fee. Table 1 provides these and further
details.
We adopted the simple previous three-supplier
example as the basis for our experiment. In a ses-
sion, the subjects participated in series of 32 rounds of
either FPAs or EAs. In each round, the subjects were
randomly repartitioned into a set of triads. The first
two rounds were for practice; the subjects earned no
money and the data are not reported. For the remain-
ing rounds, the participants’ earnings were given in
an experimental currency. The exchange rates were
Table 1 Summary of Experimental Sessions
No. of Minimum Maximum
Session Treatment Location subjects Rounds earnings earnings
1 FPA UCSD 15 32 16072 52062
2 FPA UCSD 15 32 11000 58098
3 FPA UCSD 15 32 13023 42045
4 FPA NUS 9 32 23024 48094
5 FPA NUS 18 32 21060 55072
6 EA UCSD 9 32 7005 62070
7 EA NUS 9 32 30078 87084
8 EA NUS 18 32 32084 88074
Notes. Earnings are US$ for UCSD sessions and S$ for NUS sessions; the
exchange rate at the time of the sessions was approximately US$1 = S$1.5.
The show-up fee was US$5 at UCSD and S$10 at NUS.
one experimental dollar to $0.33 (or S$0.50). In total,
we conducted 720 FPAs and 360 EAs.5
Each subject sat in a partition designed to ensure
privacy and made decisions using a personal com-
puter running a custom-designed software program.
In the FPA, at the start of each period each sub-
ject is shown his realized private cost (a new cost
was drawn each period), the period number, and the
number of participants in the auction. Then he was
prompted to submit a price (restricted to be between
0 and 30), but he could take as much time desired
to do so. After all prices were submitted, the auction
results were revealed. These results consisted of his
bid, the amount of the winning bid, and his period
profit. This information, along with the cumulative
profit, was then entered into a display at the bottom
of the computer screen for future reference. At the
conclusion of the experiment, subjects were privately
paid their total earnings.
The EA sessions followed the same procedures,
except for the execution of the auction. The computer
screen contained a display of the current auction price
and a button that a subject clicked on to irreversibly
exit the auction. The auction started with an initial
price of $21. Then the price was decremented at the
rate of 10 cents every half a second. As auction partic-
ipants exited the auction, subjects could observe the
decrement of the displayed number of participants
remaining in the auction. At the close of the auc-
tion, the subject’s cost, exit price, auction price, period
profit, and cumulative profit were entered in his or
her history viewing area.
5. Data Analysis and
Performance Results
We first address the relative performance of the two
alternative procurement procedures and observe that
5 We collected an unbalanced sample because the data in the EA
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procurement costs are lower and less variable in the
FPA. Furthermore, the empirical distribution of EA
prices first-order stochastically dominates that of the
FPA. For suppliers, average profits are higher but, at
the same time, more variable in the EA.
We start by considering the distributions of realized
FPA and EA prices. Figure 2 presents the empirical
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of prices for
each auction types. For now, let us assume that each of
the m = 720 FPA prices is an independent realization
from the continuous distribution WFPA generating the
empirical CDF, ±WFPA, and that each of the n= 360 EA
prices is an independent realization from the contin-
uous distribution WEA generating the empirical CDF,
±WEA. We test the hypothesis that these two distribu-
tions are equal, versus the alternative that are not, with
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test. The test
statistic is S̄ maxp =  ±WFPA4p5− ±WEA4p5 = 00372 and
has a p-value of essentially 0. The hypothesis test
clearly rejects the underlying distributions of auction
prices are the same. Casual inspection of Figure 2 also
suggests that WEA first-order stochastically dominates
WFPA; in other words, for every p, WEA4p5 ≤ WFPA4p5.
We use the Barrett and Donald (2003) test to evaluate
this hypothesis versus the alternative that for some p,






 ±WFPA4p5− ±WEA4p5 = 000020
The p-value of this test statistic is greater than
0.999, which leads us to not reject the hypothesis
of first-order stochastic dominance.6 Under the first-
order stochastic dominance criteria in decision mak-
ing (Seshadri et al. 1991, Levy 1992), the EA more
strongly favors the suppliers rather than the procure-
ment official.
Result 1. Procurement prices in the EA first-order
stochastically dominate those in the FPA.
The FPA delivers lower average price and lower
price variability to the procurement official. Table 2
presents the means and variances of the two price
distributions and the differences in these values. The
first column shows the mean, the standard error of the
mean, and the percentage difference in means. Two-
tailed t-tests reject that the EA mean price (5% level
of significance) and the FPA mean price (1% level of
significance) are equal to the risk-neutral Nash equi-
librium prediction of 10. Moreover, we reject that the
mean prices are the same in favor of the hypothe-
sis that the FPA mean price is lower by conducting a
t-test for unequal variances (1% level of significance).
6 The p-value of this test statistic is calculated as exp42S̄25.












Result 2. Procurement prices are lower—25.5%, in
fact—for the FPA. We reject Hypothesis 1 in favor of
its alternative, Hypothesis 3.
In the second column, we report information for
the variance of prices. Under the risk-neutral Nash
equilibrium bidding models, the variance of the prices
in the EA and FPA are 20 and 6 23 , respectively. We
give the sample variances, and beneath those, we give
bootstraps of the 95% confidence intervals of the vari-
ance under Nash equilibrium. We cannot reject that
the variance is equal to the predicted value in the EA,
but we do reject this for the FPA, as the estimated
variance is well above the confidence interval. When
comparing the variances, we reject the hypothesis that
they are the same in favor of the hypothesis that the
EA price has greater variance (Levin F -tests for het-
erogeneous variances at the 1% level of significance).
However, the price variance in the EA is only twice
as large (i.e., the −5004% change noted in the table),
not triple as predicted by Nash equilibrium.
Table 2 Summary Statistics on Prices and Profits
Mean Variance
Mean Price supplier supplier
price variance profit profit
EA
Observed 10060 19011 1068 10067
Theoretical 10 20 1067 15003
Std. error or CI 4002305 [18047121061] 4000995 [12079117014]
FPA
Observed 7090 9063 0090 3004
Theoretical 10 10067 1067 1067
Std. error or CI 4001165 [506317069] 4000375 [105011084]
% Difference −25.5 −50.4 −46.3 −71.5
Notes. Because the distribution of prices under Nash equilibrium is not nor-
mal, simple t-tests of the estimated variances are not valid. Accordingly, we
construct 95% confidence intervals (CIs) by bootstrap with 10,000 draws
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Result 3. Price variance is greater in the EA than
the FPA. Our experimental results are consistent with
Hypothesis 2.
Thus, unless a procurement organization is very
risk loving, the lower average price and lower price
variability make the FPA the better method in the
commodity situation.
What about the welfare of the suppliers? As we
see in the third column, we cannot reject (t-test at 1%
level of significance) that the mean supplier profit in
the EA is equal to the theoretical value of 1.67. The
average supplier profit in the FPA is 46.3% lower, and
we reject these profits are the same as the risk-neutral
Nash equilibrium prediction and the empirical mean
of the average profit in the EA experiments (both at
the 1% level of significance). Although suppliers actu-
ally do better, on average, in the EA, the variability
of the payoffs are about two-and-a-half times more
volatile.
Result 4. Supplier’s profits are higher in the EA
rather than the FPA, and we reject Hypothesis 4 in
favor of its alternative, Hypothesis 6. And we also
find that these profits have greater variance in the EA
as well, confirming Hypothesis 5.
The relative performances of the two procurements
methods are most consistent with the risk-averse
Nash equilibrium model. However, it is natural to
ask how robust these results are to other types of
procurement environments. Recall that the Nash equi-
librium model with risk-averse bidders is formu-
lated as a description of individual-level behavior.
So a likely necessary condition for the generaliza-
tion of our results on performance is that the model
explains what happens at the individual level as well.
As noted earlier, risk aversion does not affect the
weakly dominant strategy in the EA. Accordingly, we
should observe those who exit an auction to do so
at their true costs. Figure 3 plots sellers’ exit prices
















Figure 4 EA Price vs. Second to Exit Participant’s Cost
















versus their realized costs. Whereas much of the data
adhere closely to the 45 line as expected, there is a
surprising amount that does not. Much of these occur-
rences are at high cost levels, and the seller opts out
as soon as the auction opens at the price of $21. Per-
haps such a bidder is frustrated by receiving a high
cost? It is a different story for the observed exit prices
below cost. In most of these cases, the errant sub-
ject remains in the auction while there are still two
other remaining suppliers. Then, as soon as one of
the other suppliers exits, this individual exits as well.
We filter these likely nonsalient observations to see
how price-determining bids depend on the associated
costs. In Figure 4, we plot the realized auction price
versus the second-to-exit participant’s realized cost.
Here, we see much crisper conformity with the 45
line. To quantify this we present an ordinary least
squares (OLS) fitted trend line through the origin. The
slope coefficient is essentially 1, and this regression
explains more than 93% of the variation as indicated
by the R2 statistic.
Now let us turn our attention to the individual bids
in the FPA sessions. Figure 5 plots the 2,160 submitted
Figure 5 FPA Submitted Bid vs. Cost
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FPA bids versus realized costs, the risk-neutral Nash
equilibrium bid function, the bid equal to cost line
(the 45 line), and an OLS-fitted line for the data.
Clearly, the majority of bids are above cost but below
the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bid line—just as a
risk-averse Nash model predicts. However, there is
also a surprising amount of bids outside (particularly
above) this “cone of risk-averse bids.” We proceed by
conjecturing that there is significant heterogeneity in
how subjects behave in the FPA. Then we formulate
a model of general discrete heterogeneity in bidding
strategies that accord rationality only to some bidders.
6. A Model of Sophisticated and
Rule-of-Thumb Bidders
The structure of the first-price auction and the uni-
form distribution of costs allow us to consider the
special case of linear functions for both the rational
and boundedly rational bidders. Consider a setting in
which a supplier follows a rule r that belongs to a
set of rules R= 8AM1PM1BR9. Let ç denote a prob-
ability distribution on this set for which r is the
probability a supplier is a bidder of type r . An AM ,
or absolute markup, bidder always demands a fixed
profit amount independent of his costs. In other
words, AM bidders price according to
bAM 4ci5= ci +1
where  is the fixed absolute markup. A PM , or pro-
portional markup, bidder always demands a fixed
percentage margin based on realized costs. His bid-
ding rule is
bPM 4ci5= 41 +5ci1
where  is the proportional markup. A BR, or
strategic best-response, bidder selects a price that
maximizes his expected utility conditional on the
parameters ç, , and  and his realized cost. When
a BR bidder formulates his bidding strategy, it
is assumed that he knows the parameters ç, ,
and . Also, we assume he has the von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utility function U4y5 = y1/,
where y is a nonnegative change in wealth. In the









where M = 4N − 15+ 1.
There are several interesting things to note about
the BR bid function. It is linear in cost, with the slope
depending only on the parameter of the expected util-
ity function and the number of other bidders. Most
surprising is that the probabilities of the absolute and
percentage markup bidders, and the size of these













markups, only affect the intercept term; changes in
these values only vertically shift the BR bid function.
From this general static model, we can generate
several alternative models with appropriate parame-
ter restrictions and formulations of beliefs. The Bayes
Nash equilibrium model occurs when AM =PM = 0
and  = 1. We can replace the equality constraint on
 with the appropriate inequality constraint to obtain
the risk-averse Nash equilibrium model. The model
of Kirchkamp and Reiss (2008) is recovered by setting
PM = 0 and setting N = 2. Finally, we can obtain a
level-k model by setting either AM = 1 or PM = 1.7
With respect to predicted change in performance of
the FPA under this heterogeneous bidding mode, the
mean and variance of the winning FPA price depends
on the distribution of each supplier i’s bid. This is
given by










When calculating the expectation and variance of the
winning FPA price, it will involve piecewise integra-
tion of this function. The boundary points of these
integrals depend on the intersection points of the
three bidding rules. Figure 6 depicts the scenario
found in the subsequent data analysis.
7. Rule-Switching Dynamics:
Specification and Estimation of a
Hidden Markov Model
Because the subjects participate in repeated auctions
with changing sets of bidders, as suppliers likely do
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in practice, we incorporate adaptation into our model
through the switching of bidding rules. We start by
assuming that there is an initial portion of subjects
adopting each of the three bidding rules. Then rule
switching is described by a stationary Markov chain.
Finally, we assume a bidder follows his adopted rule
with some random noise, thus making his bidding
rule a latent variable. Such a state-space model with
latent states is called a hidden Markov model (HMM).
HMMs are a natural way to model dynamic decision
making with hidden information.8
Consider the following dynamic process. Let zit be
the rule used by subject i in period t, and let zi be the
30 element sequence of rules seller i adopts over the
course of the experiment. Define r1 as the probability
a seller follows rule r in period 1, let ç1 be the multi-
nomial probability distribution these initial probabil-
ities constitute, and let A be the matrix of transition
probabilities with element asr . In other words, this
is the probability that a subject who uses rule s in
period t − 1 transitions to rule r in the subsequent
period, asr = Pr4zit = r  zit−1 = s5. Also, denote rt as
the proportion of the subjects who are using rule r in
period t. And finally, let rt be the period t probability





A key element of our HMM is that subjects follow
rules imprecisely, resulting in an unbiased random
perturbation to each submitted bid. In particular,
we assume that when a subject follows rule r , the
price he submits is an independent random variable
that follows a normal distribution G with mean br 4cit5
and rule-specific variance 2r . The probability densi-
ties of the three bidding rules are
hAM 4pit  cit15=G4cit +1
2
AM 51
















The set of parameters of this model is ä = 8äM1äB9,
where äM is the set of variables governing the
stochastic process of rule adoption, 8ç11A9, and äB
is the set of parameters that determine the bid-
ding rules, 8111r9. The likelihood of subject i’s
8 For example, Netzer et al. (2008) study the relationships between
charitable donors and institutions, and Hui et al. (2009) present an
HMM framework for general forms of path data over time. How-
ever, ours is the first example we know of that defines the state
space as the strategies within a multiperson interaction and the
Harrovian adjustments as an adaptive learning process.
sequence of prices conditional on the parameters and
the realization of zi is




hzit 4pit  cit1ä51






We can express the likelihood of the joint sequences
of bids and bidding rule adoption as
Li4pi110001pi301zi ä5=Li4pi110001pi30 zi1ä5Li4zi äM 50
However, because the realized sequence of states
is not observable, we need to integrate out the
marginal likelihood of zi by summing over all possi-




Li4pi110001pi30 zi1ä5Li4zi äM 50







Li4pi11 0 0 0 1 pi30  zi1ä5Li4zi äM 50 (1)
A common way to find the parameter values
that maximize Equation (1) is to use the Baum–
Welch algorithm, which is a special case of the EM
algorithm.9 The output of this algorithm provides
posterior modes of äM , an estimated most likely path
ẑi for each subject, and maximum likelihood esti-
mates of äB.
One issue remains that prevents us from estimating
the model as specified; the intercept term of strate-
gic bidding rule depends on the distribution over
types and thus is a function of the parameters in äM .
To address this issue, we change the specification of









where M = 4N − 15+ 11 (2)
and I is an indicator function. We call this specifica-
tion HMM with fixed effects specifications (HMM FE
hereafter).
Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimates
of the parameters of each of the three bidding rules.
Note that all parameter estimates are significant. For
the AM rule, we see the estimated markup is a mere
9 For details on these two algorithms, we refer the reader to the
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Table 3 Estimates of Bidding Rule Parameters in the HMM FE
Model Intercept t-Statistic Slope t-Statistic  2r
AM 0080 37036 1000 — 0050
PM 0000 — 1030 10093 5027
BR 4043 25059 0079 35054 1030
Note. The dash for t-statistic indicates that this parameter is constrained and
is the given value by the model.
80 cents, which suggests quite aggressive bidding to
win the FPA. On the other hand, for the PM rule the
estimated markup is 30% over costs, which is con-
sistent with bidding aggressively for a large reward
from winning the auction. The standard error for this
rule is much higher than the standard errors of the
other two rules, symptomatic of possible heterogene-
ity in the percentage markup across subjects. For the
BR bidding rule, the inferred value of  is 1.84, which
yields a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion of
0.56—consistent with the estimates from other studies
of private value first-price sealed-bid auctions.10
After estimating the HMM FE, we calculate the the-
oretical values of the intercept of bBR for each period t
based on the maximum likelihood estimates of the
markups and the proportions of subjects estimated to
be using each rule in period t according to the ẑi. Then
we compare these theoretical calculated intercepts to
the estimated dummy variables. Figure 7 presents a
comparison of these estimated fixed effects versus the
theoretical values of the BR rule intercepts. Visual
inspection reveals that the theoretical value of the
intercept varies little over time and that the dummy
variable model also does not vary a lot. In fact, only
three of the fixed effects are significantly different
than the mean effect, suggesting that there is little
dramatic movement in the use of different rules over
time. We now examine this more explicitly.
The posterior mode estimates of the transition prob-
abilities reveal three surprising results: (1) there is
inertia in rule adoption, (2) subjects only switch
between the sophisticated rule and a rule of thumb—
or vice versa—but never switch between the two
simple rules of thumb, and (3) overall subject sophis-
tication decreases over time. The estimated initial dis-
tribution over the rules is ç̂1 = 4̂AM11 ̂PM11 ̂BR15 =
4001210014100745, and the estimated matrix of transi-
tion probabilities Â is given in Table 4. The strong
inertia in the rules subjects follows from the high esti-
mated continuation probabilities that range from 78%
to 88%. The estimated transition matrix also indicates
that there is no switching between the two simple
10 For example, consider some other estimates of constant coefficient
of relative risk aversion of 0.67, 0.52, 0.48, and 0.57, respectively,
from Cox and Oaxaca (1996), Goeree et al. (2002), Chen and Plott
(1998), and Berg et al. (2005).
Figure 7 Theoretical Values of the BR Rule Intercept Over Time and





















FE estimated BR intercept
Theoretical BR intercept
rules of thumb. The only rule transitions are between
AM and BR and PM and BR. While it is not sur-
prising that subjects switch from simple markup price
rules to the more strategically sophisticated strategy,
it is surprising that there are subjects who switch
from the BR rule to simple markup strategies. In these
cases, it is mostly the absolute markup rule that
is switched to. Why would someone make such a
switch? A natural conjecture is that estimated AM
rule has a small markup and that following that rule
will lead to more frequent wins in the auction.11
The dynamics of the estimated model suggest that
the rule adjustments mostly occur early in the exper-
iment and involve a decaying proportion of sophis-
ticated sellers. In Figure 8, we present the sequence
of estimated proportions of subjects for each period
in time, rt . Notable here is that initially 76% of the
subjects are estimated to be using a strategic best-
response strategy, but that proportion over the course
of 30 auctions falls to 64%. Meanwhile, we see an
accordingly strong increase in the proportion of AM
bidders from 11% to 29%, and the percentage of PM
bidders falls from 13% to 9%. In this estimated rule-
switching model, would the subjects learn to be more
sophisticated in a much longer sequence of auctions?
Actually, the prospect of further learning is not strong.
The limiting distribution of the matrix of transition
probabilities is ç = 4002810010100625. Inspection of
Figure 8 shows that the experiment has already con-
verged close to these values.
Does this estimated model explain the deviations
of price performance from the predictions of the risk-
neutral Nash equilibrium model? The sample mean
has a small but statistically significant negative time
trend, and the sample variance appears to have a
11 The natural way to explore hypotheses of this nature would be
to model the transition probabilities as functions of the history of
actions and payoffs. Unfortunately, there simply is not enough vari-
ation in the rule switching to generate estimated transitional prob-
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Table 4 Posterior Mode Estimates of Rule-Switching Probabilities
Zit = AM Zit = PM Zit = BR
Zit−1 = AM 0078 0000 0022
Zit−1 = PM 0000 0087 0013
Zit−1 = BR 0010 0002 0088
negative time trend but is not significant. Figure 9
depicts the theoretical mean and variance calculated
using the estimated rule-switching model parameters
as well as the empirical measurements of price mean
and variance. Visual inspection suggests that the rule-
switching model qualitatively captures the values and
trend, and we find this encouraging. However, regres-
sions of the observed averages on the theoretical pre-
dictions are not significant—although the coefficients
are close to one in both cases. For this experiment the
time variance of price average and variance dynamics













































Note. Theoretical values are calculated using HMM parameter estimates.
adjust too little over time to provide a dynamic model
a strong opportunity to explain, or fail to explain,
these dynamics. There is a plan to run future experi-
ments that we hope will create such an opportunity.
8. Specification Test of the
Dynamic Rule-Switching HMM
Our HMM framework provides a behaviorally intu-
itive formulation and a tractable extension to both
strategic heterogeneity and learning in FPAs, and
it can be estimated with well-developed economet-
ric tools. Furthermore, the insights it provides into
bidding behavior, the mixture of strategic/heuristic
bidders, and the learning to be unsophisticated are
thought provoking and could reorient the direction of
behavioral game-theoretic models of auctions. These
successes, however, are predicated on the HMM FE
being a better specification than other existing alter-
native models. In this penultimate section, we report
on a series of specification hypothesis tests in which
we evaluate the HMM FE against an assortment of
alternative models.
The first set of alternative specifications we con-
sider is a variety of static models that are nested
within the HMM FE; appropriate restrictions to
parameters in the HMM FE yield each of the alter-
native models. Each of these static models requires
that the Markov transition matrix be restricted to the
identity matrix, whose size equals the number of bid-
ding rules in the alternative. We evaluate the fol-
lowing homogeneous static models: linear bidding,
a Nash equilibrium bidding rule (linear bidding with
the restriction that the highest-cost-type demands
zero profit), PM , and AM . Each of these models is
estimated by maximum likelihood and the results
reported in columns 2–5 of Table 5. For each of the
rules, we report estimates of the appropriate inter-
cepts, coefficients, and standard deviations of errors
in terms of our HMM parameter labels. We also report
the number of free parameters of the model in the
row labeled “Parameter count.” For evaluating spec-
ifications, in the last three rows we report the log-
likelihood value of the estimated model, the Akaike
information criteria (AIC), and the likelihood ratio
test statistic along with the result of the hypothe-
sis test that the restricted model is true versus the
unrestricted HMM FE. For reference, we provide the
relevant results of the estimated HMM FE in the last
column. Clearly, the likelihood ratio test soundly
rejects each of the homogeneous static models we con-
sider, which is confirmed by the relative ranking of
the AIC values.
Next we consider a subset of nondegenerate static
mixture models that are a special case of the HMM
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Table 5 Specification Tests of the HMM FE with Respect to Alternative Static Pure and Mixture Models
Restricted
Linear linear model Mixture Mixture Full
model bBR4205= 20 Pure PM Pure AM PM&BR AM&BR mixture HMM FE
Intercept 4004 4030 — — 3078 3079 4040 4071
Cost 0083 0079 — — 0082 0082 0079 0079
BR 2014 2015 — — 1044 1040 1049 1030
41 + 5 — — 1013 — 1023 — 1023 1030
PM — — 2096 — 4038 — 4044 5020
 — — — 2031 — 3052 1016 0082
AM — — — 2037 — 3049 0098 0050
BR1 1000a 1000a — — 0081 0078 0061 0074
PM1 — — 1000a — 0019 — 0018 0014
AM1 — — — 1000a — 0022 0021 0012
Parameter count 3 2 2 2 6 6 9 44
Log-likelihood −41704 −41720 −51404 −41923 −41359 −41275 −41231 −31943
AIC 9,414 9,445 10,811 9,850 8,731 8,561 8,480 7,974
LRT: model vs. HMM FE 1,522∗∗∗ 1,556∗∗∗ 2,921∗∗∗ 1,960∗∗∗ 832∗∗∗ 663∗∗∗ 576∗∗∗ —
Note. LRT, likelihood ratio test.
aIndicates a value that is set by model constraint and not estimated.
∗∗∗Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗statistically significant at the 5% level; ∗statistically significant at the 10% level.
the mixture of AM&BR (this is the Kirchkamp and
Reiss 2008 model for multiple bidders), and the full
mixture of all three models. In addition to the previ-
ous pointed-out parameter estimates, we also report
the estimated mixture probabilities that in the case
of the HMM FE are the initial probabilities, ç1. Each
of the static mixture models is estimated by the
EM algorithm. Here, we once again soundly reject
each static mixture model in favor of the dynamic
HMM FE in both likelihood ratio tests and in AIC
comparison.
The level-k model of Crawford and Iriberri (2007)
is an obvious alternative model for comparison.
In the static formulation, the HMM FE and level-k
model follow a similar approach; however, several
key differences should be raised before making this
comparison. First, if one uses Crawford and Iriberri’s
specified k = 0 rules in our setting, then the corre-
sponding k = 1 strategies are simply the Nash equilib-
rium ones.12 To avoid making this comparison trivial,
we adopt the AM and PM as the k = 0 rules. Sec-
ond, there are two k = 1 types: BRPM , who believes
with probability 1 the other bidders follow the PM
rule; and BRAM , who believes with probability 1 the
other bidders follow the AM rule. This is in con-
trast to the HMM FE in which the BR bidders form
accurate beliefs regarding the distribution over the
bidding rules at each point in time. A consequence
of having two k = 1 types is that neither the level-k
model nor the HMM FE nests the other. Third, the
12 When types are independent draws from identical uniform dis-
tributions, the Nash equilibrium strategy is also a best response
against any linear strategy for which the bidder bids his own value
for the least competitive type.
level-k model is a formulation of how individuals ini-
tially bid in an FPA. Correspondingly, we introduce
an additional model that expands the scope of the
level-k model by incorporating an exogenous first-
order Markov rule-switching process; we call this the
level-k Markov model. This will allow us to separate
differences in model performance that relate to the
bidding rule structure and subjects’ beliefs from those
that relate to adaptation through rule switching.
The Baum–Welch algorithm estimates of the rele-
vant level-k and level-k Markov model parameters
and other statistical measures are presented in the
first two columns of Table 6. Because we cannot apply
a likelihood ratio for model specification, we report
the values of the Bayesian information criteria (BIC).
The estimation results for our version of the static
level-k are strikingly similar to those of Crawford and
Iriberri (2007). We find our estimated PM rule has a
markup of  = 0, which collapses to their bid-your-
cost type k = 0. Also, we find that no subjects fol-
low the PM rule nor the best response to our AM
rule BRAM . The subjects are roughly divided between
the AM rule and the best response to PM (which
is the Nash bidding strategy). However, the model
performs poorly against the HMM FE when com-
paring the respective AIC and BIC values. When we
allow rule switching in the level-k Markov model,
we observe a sharp increase in the log-likelihood
value, and the parameter estimates move toward
those in our HMM models. But we can see this model
specification still fares poorly with respect to our
HMM FE in both the AIC and BIC.
Finally, we consider dynamic mixture specifications
that are nested within the HMM FE. We consider
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Table 6 Specification Tests of the HMM FE with Respect to Level-k and Alternative Dynamic Mixture Models
Level-k Level-k Markov
HMM HMM
BRPM BRAM BRPM BRAM BR&PM BR&AM HMM HMM FE
Intercept 6067a 7019 8061 7008 3093 3061 4044 4071
Cost 0067a 0067a 0067a 0067a 0083 0084 0079 0079
BR 2066 0076 5021 1074 1019 1004 1030 1030
41 + 5 1.00 1.29 1028 — 1029 1030
PM 0.82 1.57 4099 — 5013 5020
 1.57 1.24 — 4028 0081 0082
AM 1.33 0.94 — 3044 0050 0050
BR1 0054 0000 0009 0035 0079 0071 0073 0074
PM1 0.00 0.09 0021 — 0017 0014
AM1 0.46 0.47 — 0029 0010 0012
Parameter count 11 23 8 8 15 44
Log-likelihood −41538 −41224 −41182 −41061 −31964 −31943
AIC 9,094 8,491 8,439 8,197 7,958 7,974
BIC 8,610 8,610 8,649 8,407 8,043 8,224
LRT: model vs. HMM FE — — 478∗∗∗ 236∗∗∗ 42∗ —
Note. LRT, likelihood ratio test.
aIndicates a value that is set by model constraint and not estimated.
∗∗∗Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗statistically significant at the 5% level; ∗statistically significant at the 10% level.
with BR&AM , and an HMM with all three bidding
rules. Both HMM models with only two bidding
rules are strongly rejected by the likelihood ratio test.
On the other hand, the pure HMM is only rejected at
the 10% level of significance by the likelihood ratio
test. This is not surprising, as we reported earlier that
only 3 of the 29 effects were statistically significant.
However, we still believe the HMM FE retains value
as it allows the BR rule to track changes in the relative
proportions at which bidders adopt the differing bid-
ding rules. In conclusion, the battery of specification
test suggests that the HMM and HMM FE approaches
are a strong improvement in the explanations of het-
erogeneity and learning in FPAs.
9. Discussion
The insights of this study should prove valuable to
both the procurement practitioner and the researcher
interested in behavioral models of bidding in auc-
tions. Our experiments provide a clear demonstration
of the relative performance of the FPA versus the EA
in a commodity procurement setting. In light of these
results, any procurement organization should proceed
cautiously when initiating a new auction strategy
for the purchase of commodities. From the procure-
ment organization’s perspective, EAs not only deliver
higher expected prices but also greater price variabil-
ity. It is worth noting that increased price variability
may have a negative impact beyond a procurement
organization’s distaste of increased price uncertainty.
Recent studies, such as Jap (2007) and Jap and Haruvy
(2008), document that the relationship between the
supplier and buyer is negatively impacted by the
adoption of the EA. The documented increase in price
variance could be a partial source of this increased
animosity.
Despite this negative result, we can offer some
thoughts regarding when changing from an FPA to an
EA might be successful. In this study we make several
strong assumptions, and relaxing any of these could
lead to different outcomes. For example, we assume
suppliers independently draw costs from the same
distribution. However, a likely scenario is that one
supplier has a clear advantage in location and a
likely lower cost; in this case it is not clear which
auction format is better. Theoretical studies, such as
Maskin and Riley (2000) and Cantillon (2008), sug-
gest that whether an EA will lead to a lower expected
price depends crucially on the distributions of costs.
One area where EA-like auctions show promise is
in the procurement of goods for which price is not
the sole differentiating attribute between suppliers.
Researchers have studied two cases: when nonprice
attributes are exogenous and when these attributes
are endogenously determined within the auction.
In the first case, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2007) find significant gains to the procurement offi-
cial when suppliers bid on price, and then the buyer
chooses the winner (as opposed to awarding the con-
tract to the lowest bidder). The performance of the
buyer determined winner EA versus the FPA in these
settings is studied in Haruvy and Katok (2008), and
they find the FPA is better if suppliers have accurate
and precise information regarding the quality of other
sellers. On the other hand, Shachat and Swarthout
(2010) find that an EA with buyer-assigned bidding
credits can provide better outcomes than the FPA for
both the buyer and the suppliers. For the latter case,
there is also a large and promising literature on suc-
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quality is determined within multiattribute versions
of the EA—for example, Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) and
Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005).
Our HMM of sophisticated and rule-of-thumb bid-
ders both answers some questions and raises others.
Our results provide strong evidence for discrete het-
erogeneous bidding behavior, and the procurement
setting has allowed for easy identification of some
bidding rules of thumb. Furthermore, we make a
significant advancement in the learning of bidding
behavior through the introduction of a rule-switching
dynamic. Somewhat disconcerting is the conclusion
that individuals unlearn strategic sophistication as
they gain experience. Clearly, a next step is to gen-
eralize the transition probabilities from being purely
exogenous to being functions of the subjects’ experi-
ences. There must be something in the way partic-
ipants cognitively process feedback that leads them
from the expected utility-maximizing strategy. One
conjecture we find attractive is that subjects more
strongly react to whether they win or lose when fol-
lowing a particular strategy than they do to the full
opportunity costs of following alternative strategies.
To test such a conjecture, as well as others, one would
need experimental sessions with many more repe-
titions to obtain significant estimates on transition
probability covariates. Another direction of inquiry
is to ask whether the simple bidding heuristics we
observe also hold in the forward auction case. The
experiments and subsequent analysis in Kirchkamp
and Reiss (2008) suggest that they do, particularly the
absolute markup strategy. But to identify the percent-
age markup strategy, experiments need to be run for
which the number of auction participants is a within-
subject treatment variable. Finally, an important ques-
tion is whether one can use a model like ours in a
structural econometric estimation to recover individ-
ual parameters and improve upon approaches that
assume pure Nash equilibrium play.
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Appendix. Derivation of the Best-Response
Bidding Rule
Here, we derive the best response (BR) bidding rule assum-
ing the multinomial distribution function ç over the set of
bidding rules R = 8AM1PM1BR9. For now, let us assume
that a BR bidder prices according to a strictly increas-
ing bounded function, thus having an inverse, denoted as
bBR4ci5. When a BR bidder formulates his bidding strategy, it
is assumed that he knows the parameters ç, , and . Also
assume that he also has the von Neumann–Morgenstern
expected utility function U4y5= y
1
 , where y is a nonneg-
ative change in wealth. If the BR wins the forward auction,
his award is his value minus his bid; otherwise, there is
no award. The BR bidder’s expected utility is the utility of
his profit times the probability of winning the FPA, i.e., the
probability his bid is lower than all other bids. This proba-
bility is
Pr4pj < pi5 = 41 −AM −PM 5 · Pr4pj < bBR4ci55+AM
· Pr4pj < ci +5+PM · Pr4pj < 41 +5ci50
As each of the three bidding rules has an inverse, we can
restate this probability as
Pr4pj < pi5 = 41 −AM −PM 5 · F 4b
−1
BR4pj55+AM






where F denotes the uniform distribution. In an FPA with
N − 1 other suppliers, the probability of winning with a
submitted price pj is
Pr4pj < pi3 i = 11 0 0 0 1N − 15= 6Pr4pj < pi57
N−10
Thus the expected utility of a bid pj conditional on realized
value cj is
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The first-order condition of maximizing expected utility




41 −AM −PM 5 · 4cH − b
−1
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Now if one assumes that all the BR bidders are using the
same bid function, the above expression reduces to the fol-
lowing differential equation:
cH − cj +AM+ 4/41 +55PM
pj − cj
=
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The solution and BR bidding function is
bBR4cj5=
4cH +AM ·5 · 41 +5





where M =  · 4N − 15.
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